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Dear All,
It was a couple of weeks ago that I received
an email from a colleague of mine who was
telling me about a controversial novel written
by Sherry Jones on the Prophet Muhammed’s
(SAV) wife, Aisha. First, I thought that this
was just another Islamophobic provocation.
However, after conducting some more
extensive research on the topic; I decided to
i n te r v i e w S h e r r y J o n e s i n o rd e r to
understand what she really thinks and
b e l i eve s a b o u t I s l a m . I s s h e re a l ly
Islamophobic? Or is she a naïve Westerner
who is trying to promote herself by using the
private life of the most sacred person in
Islam? Or are there any political motivations
behind this novel? I believe that we as
Muslims – either by culture or religion ‐
should understand and differentiate between
the Orientalist framework which is based on
the imperialistic/racist approach similar to
what happened in the Danish cartoon crisis in
the name of free speech; with people who
may have good intentions but really do not
understand cultural differences and
sensitivities. I did not read her novel, I haven’t
read any of her novels; however, personally I

would like Qind out who she really is. Random
House cancelled the publication of her novel,
The Jewel of Medina, as a result of a possible
“terrorist” reprisal attack. On the other hand,
Pakistani‐born Kamran Pasha’s new novel,
Mother of the Believers will be released in
April of 2009. As far as I know Pasha’s new
novel is not different than Sherry Jones’s The
Jewel of Medina. I wonder why some people
are suddenly interested in studying and
writing about Prophet Muhammed’s personal
life, instead of writing in the constructive
framework. My intention is to understand the
motives behind these writings. I have only
questions, no answers, but answers will be
provided by the author herself, and you, the
readers will decide whether she is genuine or
not.
Peace and Salam to you all,
Tugrul Keskin
October, 2008 / Blacksburg, Virginia
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Interview with Sherry Jones
on Her Novel “The Jewel of Medina”
Islam and Free Speech
Tugrul Keskin: Thank you for accepting this
interview. I will be very honest and
straightforward with you in this interview.
This is a very sensitive issue for Muslims
that you have broached, in trying to dig up
and question the Prophet Muhammed's
(SAV) private life; and I believe that as a
Muslim, you have a right to criticize Islam
and Muslims, however, there is thin line
between criticism and insult/racism, like in
the case of the Danish cartoon crisis. Would
you please tell us about yourself and your
recent novel, The Jewel of Medina?
Sherry Jones: I came across the story of
A’isha for the Qirst time shortly after the
World Trade Center attacks in 2001. As a
woman and a feminist, I was captivated by
her wit, intelligence, and strength. I began to
read more about A’isha and her sister‐wives,
and about Muhammad and the revealing of
Islam, and I was hooked. My goal was to
bring these tales, already familiar to Muslims
in the rest of the world, to Western
audiences. I wanted to honor A’isha and the
other wives by bringing them to life on the
page and allowing their voices to be heard in
a historical tradition that largely focuses on
the men.
Tugrul Keskin: I don't think that many
Westerners understand the level or context
of certain sensitivities in other cultures.
From my perspective, many Westerners not
only criticize, but also look down on Muslims
and demonize Islam in the name of free
speech. This is not the way to build bridges;
it is the way to destroy bridges. Are you one
of these people? Basically, why did you write
the novel about the private life of the most
sacred person in Islam? What was or is your
aim?
Sherry Jones: As I said, my aim was simply to
tell A’isha’s story. I felt called to her, a

spiritual calling. She embodies the woman
that I would like to be: smart, strong, witty,
spiritual, loving, giving, and honest with
herself about her Qlaws. As I wrote and
researched, I developed a respect and regard
for the Prophet and for Islam. At the same
time, I regard him as a human being, a
“mortal man,” as he called himself. He must
have experienced the desires, hungers, fears,
and failings that we all struggle with. I
believe that, by bringing those qualities to
light, we honor Muhammad as a being who
transcended his Qlawed humanity by the
grace of God and so served as an example of
what is possible for us all, if we seek and
strive as he did.
Tugrul Keskin: Today, especially after 9/11,
many people call themselves an expert on
Islam and Muslim societies. We can Qind
these people in Washington DC or
universities, or at think tanks as just a few
examples. Even in my university, people who
have never been in any Muslim populated
countries and don't speak any languages are
called ‘Middle East experts’ or ‘experts on
Muslim societies and Islam.’ Of course, many
of these experts use books on Islam from a
negative viewpoint to "educate" students.
How much do you know about Islam and the
Prophet's Muhammed's (SAV) life? Where
did you learn this? What sources did you use
for your book?
Sherry Jones: I am certainly no expert, only
an interested Westerner who is always
learning. I have not been able to afford to
travel to Saudi Arabia, where “The Jewel of
Medina” takes place, and where travel has
been so restricted. At any rate, 14 centuries
have certainly altered the culture and the
landscape a great deal. I did study two years
of Arabic ‐‐ all that was offered at the time ‐‐
at the University of Montana, and I took an
Islamic history course taught by Mehrdad
Kia from Iran.
As for my sources, I have read everything
written in English that I could Qind. My
bibliography comprises some 30 books,
including a four‐volume biography of the
[2]

Prophet by Ibn Kathir, written in the 14th
century; various collections of
Hadith;“Women in Islam” by the Moroccan
scholar Fatima Mernissi; and “Muhammad: A
Biography” by the noted Western religious
historian Karen Armstrong. My complete
bibliography is available on my weblog,
http://sherryjones.blogspot.com.
Tugrul Keskin: How do you deQine free speech
according to your book? Do you have the right
to talk about my private life, do you think this
is free speech?
Sherry Jones: My right to free speech
compasses my right to artistic expression. In
the United States, we grow up learning that
the right to freedom of speech, thought, and
expression are as fundamental as the right to
breathe and live.
Tugrul Keskin: If this is a free speech issue,
then why did the West not pay attention to
Norman Finkelstein when he could not get
tenure at DePauw University, or Ward
Churchill who was Qired from the University
of Colorado as a result of the free speech
argument? Do you think that free speech is
used as an excuse to insult and discriminate
against people and cultures who are not
White/Christian/Western?
Sherry Jones: I can’t speak to these cases,
because I’m not familiar with them. However,
I can tell you that our First Amendment rights
are always being debated and discussed in
this country. Schools and libraries, publicly
funded, ban books because they are deemed
offensive, and people protest. Racists make
statements that offend certain groups; people
write books that offend others. But we
tolerate these hateful forms of expression
because, if we start banning one form, then
where does it stop?
No one wants to live in a totalitarian regime,
where every word is monitored.
Exceptions would be forms of speech that
endanger others, such as death threats, and
forms of expression that cause actual harm to

others, such as child pornography. These are
considered prosecutable offenses under the
law.
Tugrul Keskin: Do you think Muslims need
another Rudyard Kipling's the White Man's
Burden in order to reform Islam?
Sherry Jones: “Need” is not the issue here. I
didn’t write my book because I thought
anyone “needed” it. I wrote it because I was
excited about the remarkable A’isha bint Abi
Bakr and I thought others would like to read
about her, too. However, I do think the world
will beneQit from learning about the
egalitarian underpinnings of Islam and the
crucial role of women in forming the Umma.
Tugrul Keskin: Today, there are three types of
people who study Islam in the Western
Universities and Societies. First, Orientalists
who are not genuine and are the politically
motivated crusaders; second, Populists who
study Islam because Islam is an important
subject to specialize in, in order to Qind a job
and niche for their careers; third, people who
study Islam, who genuinely want to learn
about Islam and Muslim Societies; I believe
this third category of people are more
objective than the rest. Where do you place
yourself?
Sherry Jones: I’ll bet there are more than
three kinds! But I approached my research
with a genuine interest in learning more.
What I learned, I wanted to share with others.
Of course, what I’ve written is just MY
interpretation of what I’ve read. It’s not the
deQinitive version of A’isha’s life, only my
vision of what her life could have been like.
Tugrul Keskin: On September 30, 2005,
Jyllands‐Posten Newspaper from Denmark,
published cartons of the Prophet Muhammed
(SAV) and this fueled tensions between
Muslims and West/Europe/US. Do you think
that this was an honest mistake? Or was the
publishing of these cartoons intentional with
political motivations behind it? Most
importantly, how do you compare your book
with this incident?
[3]

Sherry Jones: The publishing of the Danish
cartoons was another exercise of freedom of
expression. The message was clear: Islam has
become perceived, in the Western world, as a
religion of violence and destruction. Those
who protested with violence did nothing to
change that perception.
My book is a book of women’s empowerment
that also attempts to promote Western
understanding of a religion that is Qilled with
misperceptions in the States. I feel uniquely
situated to write this book, and its sequel,
because I held those same erroneous notions
of Islam before I began my research.
Tugrul Keskin: Do you believe Islam is a
peaceful religion or a religion of war as some
Western conservative “crusaders” claim?
Sherry Jones: Islam in its pure form is a
religion of peace, in my opinion. Muhammad
admonished Believers to Qight in self‐defense
only, and he practiced that. He forgave his
enemies ‐‐ even those, such as Abu Sufyan’s
wife, Hind, who didn’t ask for it. He said, “We
are all created from the same soul.” You can’t
get much more peaceful, and egalitarian, than
that. Unfortunately for moderate Muslims,
violent extremists within the faith have
created a negative portrait of Islam in the
Western world. Some believe that Muslims
want to conquer and rule the world under
Sharia law. I hope my book will help those who
read it to understand the true Islam, as
Muhammad intended it.

of Afghanistan and Iraq. I want us to reject this
culture of fear imposed upon us both by
violent religious fanatics and our own
government. I wish for us all courageous lives.
Sherry Jones: A journalist for 28 years, Sherry
Jones has worked as a staff reporter for
newspapers in suburban Philadelphia, North
Carolina, and Montana, and has published in
numerous magazines including Newsweek,
Southwest Art, CMJ, American Cowboy, and
Rider. She is a freelance correspondent for
BNA Inc., an international news agency in the
Washington, D.C. area and Platt's Metals Week
and Women's eNews in New York. "The Jewel
of Medina" is her debut novel.
About the Novel: "The Jewel of Medina" by
Sherry Jones is a historical novel about the life
of A'isha bint Abi Bakr, the youngest, and
favorite, wife of the Prophet Muhammad. Set
in 7th‐century Saudi Arabia, it details the
founding of Islam, complete with battles and
political intrigue, and examines the role of
women in the early Islamic community.
Announcement: MESA gettogether
Dear Mideast sociologists and fellowtravelers,
I hope that you will join me for an informal
get-together at the Middle East Studies
Association conference at 3 p.m., Monday,
November 24, 2008. We will meet at the
lobby of the conference hotel and, depending
on our numbers, grab refreshments at the
hotel cafe or a nearby eatery while learning
about each others' research and concocting
potential collaborations.

Tugrul Keskin: Do you think that the current
US foreign policy toward Islam and Muslim
Societies are based on an imperialist agenda?

I realize that some of you have sessions at
this time, and I apologize for the inevitable
scheduling conflicts!
-Charles Kurzman
Department of Sociology
CB#3210, 155 Hamilton Hall
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
Phone: (1) (919) 962-1241
Fax: (1) (919) 962-7568
E-mail: kurzman@unc.edu
Web: http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman

Sherry Jones: Yes, I do. And it is a real tragedy.
The United States is now perceived ‐‐ a
misperception based on the actions of our
government ‐‐ as a bully. Most people I know
don’t agree with our foreign policy concerning
the Middle East. I’ve participated in several
protests and vigils for peace, and I hold great
hope that a new president will bring change.
Killing only begets killing, and produces
nothing but hatred and fear. I want the U.S. out
[4]

The Strange Case of the UIJ, or the
evolutions of Uzbek Jihadism
Didier Chaudet
The French Institute of International Relations
didier.chaudet@gmail.com
Historically, Uzbek Salafism is, to some
extent, unique in Central Asia. It is the only one
in the area that has stayed strongly revolutionary,
uncompromising, and prone to violence from its
beginning in the Ferghana Valley at the
beginning of the 1990s to its new safe heaven in
Waziristan, Pakistan. Like their Tajik
counterparts, they had the desire to conquer
power, but contrary to them, their path made
them go further and further from the Islamist
mainstream to an “al qaedan” way of thinking.
Its final result is the Islamic Jihad Union. This
group is probably not very important in terms of
numbers, but it can organize itself from Greater
Central Asia to Europe, and it sees its fight as an
international one. Such an evolution makes it a
potential global security threat in the future. How
come a local islamist fight in Central Asia can
evolve in such an “unnatural” way?
The Islamist situation in Uzbekistan was
no different from the one in Tajikistan after the
independence. Groups like Islam Lashkarlari
(Warriors Of Islam) and its military wing Adolat
(Justice) wanted to create an Islamic state,
something that meant nothing else than a state
able to deal with the post-Soviet situation.
Indeed, the people in Uzbekistan lost a lot with
the fall of the Soviet Union: free medical
services, free education, and more importantly,
control of the prices of primary goods. They saw
mafia getting stronger, being able to challenge
the state, and the society becoming more and
more unequal and unsecured. But from 1992, the
path of Tajik and Uzbek Islamists went in very
different paths: during this year already, Islam
Karimov had been able to reaffirm its power and
to strike hard against any kind of opposition.
Tajik official power has not been that strong, and

the country fell into civil war. So from the
beginning of the 1990s, for the outside world,
Uzbekistan looked like an example of stability in
Central Asia. But nothing could have been
further from the truth.
In fact, the 1990s were the time of an
extreme radicalisation of Uzbek Salafism. First,
one can easily make the case, through the actions
of Adolat, that the Uzbek movement was already
prone to violence. But once in exile, the Islamists
could not get the peace of the defeated. Indeed,
the Uzbek regime continued its fight regionally
against its opposition, sending secret services to
target Islamist and non-Islamist enemies of the
state. The regime was only beginning to stabilize
itself, and the fear of a Tajik fate made Tashkent
choose drastic methods to avoid destabilization.
As explained by Islam Karimov himself in July
1992: “It is necessary to straighten out the brains
of one hundred people in order to save the lives
of thousands”. It meant, by the end of the 1990s,
a strong repression against the religious and
independent part of the population, without
distinction between simple believers and possible
suspects. Such politics reinforce tensions inside
the country, making it easier for the Islamists in
exile to organize sleeper cells. Outside
Uzbekistan they clearly positioned themselves as
struggling in a regional, and not only national,
war, fighting the Tajik government with the local
IRP (Islamic Revival Party). They clearly
appeared as hardliners, refusing the inter-Tajik
peace in 1997. They also opposed their allies on
nationalism: the Tajik Islamists were in favor of
the Afghan Tajik Ahmad Shah Masoud, when the
Uzbeks, on purely ideological ground, preferred
to support the Taliban. Those divergences
explain the formal birth of the IMU (Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan) in 1996. From 1999 to
2001, this group has been able to put pressure on
all the countries surrounding the Ferghana
Valley. Indeed, its military commander, Juma
Namangani, was able to use the Tajik part of the
Valley, and the Afghan Emirate of the Taliban, as
his bases, and to strike forcefully in Kyrgyzstan
and in Uzbekistan. He was also able to play those
three Central Asian countries against one another
[5]

through his military actions, making them
distrust one another, and pushing Tashkent to
extreme reactions, this time against its
neighbours. For example, Islam Karimov did
not hesitate to order the bombings of Kyrgyz
territory, or to mine the Uzbek borders with
those two countries. During this period,
Namangani has been able to organize effective
sleeper cells, in Kyrgyzstan in particular, as well
as to continue to use rug trafficking in order to
finance his war against the Uzbek regime.
Without the American campaign against
Afghanistan by the end of 2001, this is very
possible to imagine a Central Asian region being
more and more disrupted by the consequences
of IMU’s military actions. The loss of the
Afghan safe heaven has clearly been a terrible
blow for the IMU: Juma Namangani died in
Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban, the
organization lost its training camps, and the
other leader of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, has
not been able to keep the group united.
Numerous fighters decided to abandon the
movement at that time. This is interesting to
note that those who did so disapprove the focus
on other targets than the “Near Enemy”, i.e. the
Uzbek regime. They did not see the fight for the
Taliban, or against others than Islam Karimov,
as relevant. It means that the ones who kept
their affiliation, and their desire to fight, were
much closer of the al qaedan vision of a total
war against the Near and the Far Enemy. In his
speeches, Tahir Yuldashev still tried to keep a
balance between those interested in a concrete
fight against the post-Soviet Central Asian
regimes of the Ferghana Valley, and those who
saw the war in much broader terms.
Some in the latter group grew
disillusioned with this approach and decided to
split from the original movement. They formed
together the Islamic Jihad Union, or Islamic
Jihad Group, in 2002. If numerous Islamist
groups in Central Asia seem to exist only on
paper and in the head of the members of Uzbek
secret services, this one is very real. It appears
that this group has been responsible of the first
suicide bombings in Central Asia (March-April

2004), and the first attacks against the Far
Enemy in the area, i.e. the US and Israel
(suicide attacks against the embassies, June
2004). It has to be connected with suicide
bombings of Uzbeks against the Coalition in
Afghanistan, expressing a deeper involvement
against the Far Enemy than ever before. The
choice of this new group to see the war in a
broader sense was proved again in November
2006, when an IJU plot failed, this time in
Islamabad, with Pakistani recruits, who tried to
attack government buildings. Last, but not least,
September 2007 saw the discovery of IJU
sleeper cells in Germany, recruiting GermanTurks and German converts in order to strike
this European ally of the US in the war for
Afghanistan. At the same period, the group
engaged itself in an intense propaganda
campaign on Turkish Islamist sites in order to
make it better known. The leadership is still
Uzbek, but it is now clear that the IJU became a
kind of Turkic Al Qaeda: clearly internationalist
in its vision, its first goal is a revival of the
Afghan Emirate of mullah Omar. Such a
situation is particularly disturbing, as it is a
proof that local politics in Greater Central Asia,
and the support received for them from the
Great Powers made such a radicalisation
possible.

Didier Chaudet is a Research Fellow at IFRI
(The French Institute of International Relations
– IFRI is one of the main think tanks in the
European Union). He is a Lecturer at the
Institute of Political Studies in Paris (Sciences
Po Paris) on Security in Greater Central Asia
(Post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan). He was a Fox Fellow at Yale
University
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'Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan: A
Postcolonial Perspective'
Reed Taylor
The Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical, and
Cultural Thought
Virginia Tech
rtaylor2@vt.edu
This article is a summary of a study that
began from a research project on Hizb ut Tahrir
(HT) in Indonesia, where I sought to explain the
appeal of the organization using a post-colonial
approach. While I was doing research on this
organization through Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia
(HIT) website, I came across an article on the
plight of HT members in Uzbekistan and how
important it was for HTI to support its fellow
members. This is interesting because most
Indonesians do not know where Uzbekistan is,
or feel a connection to the people in Uzbekistan
because of its Muslim population. In contrast,
HTI has disseminated several articles on the
importance of solidarity between Indonesian
members and Uzbekistan members. And from
this, I began to question a common assertion
that HT is a relatively disconnected political
movement based primarily on regional and
national borders. Instead, I propose that as a
pan-Islamic movement, HT should be
understood as a group whose members see
themselves as belonging to an identity that
crosses regional and national boundaries.
Therefore, I argue that the post-colonial
approach that I have used in the case of Hizb ut
Tahrir Indonesia can also shed some light, at
least in part, on the case of Hizb ut Tahrir
Uzbekistan.
Currently, HT in Uzbekistan is explained
in terms of a clash of civilization model, or in
terms of a resurgent Marxist-Leninist model. I
argue that both of these theories are antagonistic
and coming from Eurocentric perspectives. An
alternative is to consider the postcolonial

condition that, I would argue, has had a much
larger influence on the formation of HT and its
appeal in a postcolonial context. Beyond
explaining the development and structure of HT,
postcolonial theory points towards a reification
of a neo-colonialist mentality by internalizing
and negating a hybridized identity between the
colonizer and the colonized. If one agrees with
the thesis proposed in this paper, it can be
argued that there is another threat of
neocolonialism that emerges from within. We
should consider changing our discourse to focus
on the postcolonial conditions of HT in
Uzbekistan and less on the call for an authentic
Islamic identity.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a modern political
Islamic movement that aims at establishing a
global Islamic state that is meant to subvert the
current postcolonial conditions in predominantly
Muslim regions of the world. Hizb ut-Tahrir
does not want to work from within the current
political arrangements to establish political and
social change; instead it is trying to form a
viable alternative in the form of a transnational
state. What is not being overtly stated in Hizb
ut-Tahrir’s writings is the underlying connection
between the colonized psyche and mimicry of
the colonizer as an attempt to reverse the predetermined roles that are being questioned in
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology (Bhabha, 1994).
A postcolonial critique offers several
advantages over approaching Hizb ut-Tahrir
from the perspective of a ‘Clash of Civilizations
with the West.It has been customary to refer to
an impending battle between civilizations in the
discussions of Hizb ut-Tahrir and even within
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s own discourse presented on
online on their websites and in their texts (Hizb
ut-Tahrir, 1998, 1999, 2001, n.d.). However, if
we consider the historical development of Hizb
ut-Tahrir’s ideology and if we reconsider their
texts form a postcolonial critique, Hizb ut-Tahrir
no longer embodies a homogenous Islamic
culture that is purportedly antagonistic to a
modern Western culture. Instead of creating a
divide between Islamic populations and Western
[7]

countries, a postcolonial critique is applied to
destabilize and decenter these fixed borders to
move beyond a reification of colonialism. By
appealing to Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial
discourse, the emphasis is placed on identity
formation and the violent effects on the psyche
for both the colonized and colonizer. It is the
decentering of these binaries within colonialism
of the Self/Other, black/white, core/periphery,
etc. that creates the foundation for postcolonial
movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.
In Hizb ut-Tahrir’s writings, there are
several important concepts that have been
appropriated from modern political Islamists
discussed above that are used to justify a global
Islamic state. The most important concept is
Khalifa, which is used by Hizb ut-Tahrir to
appeal to the nostalgia of a return to the time of
the first four Caliphs as way to remove the
contemporary Muslim from the coercive powers
of secularism, democracy, and capitalism. In
addition to Khalifa, Hizb ut-Tahrir appropriates
several other terms in making their argument for
a global Islamic state, including the concepts of
ummah, kuffar, and ijtihad; each corresponding
to a wider discourse of anti-democracy, antihuman rights, and anti-individualism
respectively. Through the use of each of these
terms, I argue that Hizb ut-Tahrir is reacting to
the colonial model rather than attempting to
return to a more egalitarian and pious past.
In Homi Bhabha’s (1994) The Location
of Culture, Bhabha wrote that the identity of
someone colonized is not simply defined by
being marked as other to the colonizer, but it is a
decentering of the ‘I’ as the intervening space of
the Other as an enunciation that is inscribing the
colonizer’s Self. Hybridity for Bhabha can only
occur in this ‘in-between’ state of fluidity, where
antagonistic binaries of self/other, black/white,
core/periphery, etc. are being rearticulated as,
“neither the One … nor the Other … but
something else besides” ((Bhabha, p. 41). It is in
this Third Space that the lens of the Self and
Other are dissolved and a transformative process
of hybridity takes place. What should be
becoming clear is that hybridity is not the

replacing of one cultural language for another
and it is not simply the incorporation of one
cultural language into another; it is the
negotiation between interconnected cultural
languages with drastically different relations to
power. However, power is not clearly defined; it
is distorted such that the colonizer/colonized are
both trapped by having to define themselves
based on the interstices of the Other, neither
escapes unharmed (Bhabha, p. 153-154).
Another important concept found in
Bhabha that is an aspect of cultural hybridity is
mimicry. Part of the structure of colonialism is
that a segment of the colonized population is
needed to act as a middleman between the
colonizer/colonized; they are required to mimic
the colonizer by copying his language, customs,
and dispositions. From the colonizer ’s
perspective, it is not enough to simply dress and
act like him; they must hold the same values and
appreciate the world as he does. However, this
can never be an exact replica of one cultural
language for another because of the
ambivalence and power inequalities of the
interaction. For the colonized, mimicry is a
further depersonalization and suppression of the
‘I’ in identity because it only validates the
colonizer’s Self and leaves the colonized with
an empty shell of the Other that is only visible
through the colonizer’s eyes.
Bhabha’s discussion centers on the
ongoing legacy of colonialism that continues to
have a profound effect on the formation of a
contemporary Muslim identity. He prescribes a
renewal of a historically informed cultural
identity that can potentially overcome the
legacies of colonialism. However, Hizb utTahrir rejects a negotiation between cultural
languages and calls for an outright égation of
Western culture, in a similar vein to the
colonialist model that Hizb ut-Tahrir is trying to
overcome. The basis for this application is a
desire to form a uniquely non-Western Islamic
identity ; however, such an identity cannot
ignore the mental and material reality of the
postcoloniality within the égatio. Instead, Hizb
ut-Tahrir ends up reversing the ‘I’ from Other to
[8]

Self without escaping the fundamental
dynamic that égationes this colonialist model.
It is due to this lack of negotiation that Hizb
ut-Tahrir is unable move beyond colonialism.
The problem is that by not negotiating
between a contemporary Muslim identity and
a Western hegemonic cultural identity, Hizb
ut-Tahrir is re-inscribing through mimicry the
current postcolonial arrangements but in the
éga of colonizer through the revival of a
‘pure’ Islamic cultural identity (Bhabha,
122-126). It is in this blurred copy of
colonialism that Hizb ut-Tahrir has positioned
itself.
In contrast to this postcolonial critique,
Hizb ut-Tahrir is generally presented as being
a radical political Islamic movement in
accordance with a traditional Islamic culture
that clashes against a modern Western culture
or, if read literally, as a political Islamic
movement that advocates a return to the past
glory of Islam through establishing a
transnational Caliphate. The essential problem
with both of égat readings of Hizb ut-Tahrir is
that they emphasize divergence without
leaving room for a Third Space of enunciation
(Bhabha, 56). Hizb ut-Tahrir is best viewed as
a égation of Western hegemonic culture from
within, instead of an external culture that is
distinct and antagonistic towards the West.
Based on the above postcolonial positioning of
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, it can be argued that
they are neo-colonialists in the making.

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. 02 Aug. 2008.
“Empat Muslimah Uzbekistan Ditahan Antara
3 dan 5 Tahun Penjara Karena Menyebarkan
Islam” 14 Sept. 2008.
Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. 11 Sept. 2008.
“Pejabat Uzbek Perintahkan Polisi Awasi
Kaum Muslim Beribadah di Masjid” Hizb utTahrir Indonesia. 14 Sept. 2008.

Reed Taylor received his bachelors from the
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Capitalist system has always been
tagged with inherent financial fragility and
business cycles. The recent credit crisis has
made many staunch supporters of free market
mechanism think to question its efficient
working without active state supervision and
intervention. For socialist comrades what
happened in the last few months is quite natural
and it was supposed to happen. For Islamists,
Muslim economists and activists of Islamic
political, this is the begining of the fall of
capitalist economic system and replacing it with
an Islamic financial system which is interestfree, more stable and socially responsible. In
this brief essay questions such as : does the idea
of Islamic bank offers a panacea to the current
crisis? Is there such thing as interest-free
banking system free of all inherent fragilities
deemed to be the hallmark of the interest-based
financial system? How and to what extent the
operations of Islamic banking have retained the
ideals of offering interest-free arrangements in
its actual practice?
Of all the capitalist institutions the only
one that has posed itself as the most intimidating
challenge to the Muslim thinkers is the modern
institution of banking. To scuffle this specter,
an army of Islamic scholars, intellectuals and
Muslim economists have set out to model the
idea of an Islamic alternative i.e., Islamic
banking. Enormous energies have been put in
this direction in the last four decades. A number
of theoretical models of Islamic banking have
been proposed in the literature and applied in
practice. A number of enterprising individuals
and states have tried to implement these models
and produce a model of Islamic banking system.

Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Sudan
and Malaysia are to name a few such states.
Several academic institutions were established
such as the International Institute of Islamic
Economics (IIIE) in Islamabad and Islamic
Research and Training Institute (IRTI) at IDB
Jeddah to offer courses and degree programs, to
teach and research and train individuals for
Islamic banking operations. Such academic
pursuits were co-supported by an active media
campaign run by different Islamic banks and
Islamic institutions to publicize and promote the
institutions of Islamic banking. In Pakistan a
number of electronic channels broadcasted
sponsored programs on Islamic banking and its
Shariah-compliant products. Most of the
research conducted in the area of Islamic
economics was conducted on different aspects
of Islamic financial system with less focus on
other areas such as poverty alleviation and
distribution issues. This issue of research-bias is
beautifully explained by scholars such as
Taimur Kurn and Izzuddin Pal in their seminal
works on Islamic economics.
Claims of Muslim economists and
Islamic banks are mounting. They claim for
multi-billion dollars deposits and financing with
a higher rate of return on deposits. The rate of
return is legitimized on the basis of the element
of risk and thus its variability. The growth and
expansion of Islamic banks worldwide is also
shown to be tremendous. Its popularity and is
claimed to be not only among the Muslim
countries but also in Europe and the USA.
Claims are also made that non-Muslim countries
also desire Islamic banking branches and
Islamic windows. Although, less effort has been
made to enquire why this desire is common
among the non-Muslim countries? Is it the
quality of Islamic banking and novelty of its
products over the interest-based commercial
banks or the underlying motivation for attracting
more savings of the Muslim communities?
Islamic banks offer a number of socalled Islamic modes of financing. There are
modes of financing such as Modaraba and
[10]

Musharaka which are considered at the core of
the Shariah as permissible and interest-free
among all the scholars. And there are other tools
such as Murabaha etc which are found to be on
the margins of the Shariah-complacency.
History of Islamic banking practice reveal that
an initial moving passion was shown for the
former tools and less for the latter one. But later
this composition changed and more enthusiasm
was shown for the relatively risk-free modes
and less for the other tools. Although, the former
had more risk involved but close to Shariah in
letter and spirit. What happened that in actual
practice the true banking instincts (no risk, more
profit) prevailed over this altruistic passion and
the operations switched to tools such as
Murabaha etc. There are also empirical
evidences of how the profit motive has
compelled the Islamic banking practice to
provide more resources to trading than to more
productive sectors such as agriculture and
industry.
All Muslim economists do not fully
endorse the current practice of Islamic banking.
Within the ranks of Muslim economists, a
number of dissidents can be found. They are on
the margins and often less heard but these are
voices to be voiced. Some have serious
reservations over the very notion of the idea and
current practice of Islamic banking system. One
such renown scholar when asked about the
current status of Islamic bank was reported to
have responded as … « if the possibility of an
Islamic prostitution can exist then an Islamic +
Bank might be sellable… what is supposed to
be the ideals of the Islamic banks are in contrast
to the very instincts of the banking industry.
Banks are not supposed to be risking itself and
its customers nor deemed to be working for
alleviation of poverty. If they have to be, then
they will convert to another form and will cease
to be known as banks. Banks are not NGOs, nor
welfare organizations. Banks are institutions for
earning profits through lending and borrowing
without risking its loans and profit and the
capital of its customers. » (face to face interview
2005)

Some basic theoretical work is done by
Ghamidi (2008) and his students to promote the
concept that all institutions of capital formation
and its management be under the control of the
public sector. The model propos es a
dichotomous arrangement where financial
management should completely come under the
control of the state and the real sector
comprising by industry, agriculture and trade be
given in the private hands. Ghamidi’s assertion
is that it doesn’t matter how much effort is done
to eliminate interest from the banking
transactions it will re-enter through backdoor
and will hamper all such efforts of eliminating
interest from financial transactions. This idea
couldn’t gain currency among the populist
Muslim economists and corporate-Ulama.
Overwhelming majority of the
contributors to the theoretical models are those
who were trained in the Western new-classical
tradition of economics. And since these modern
educated economists were Muslims too, they
came up with banking models with a patchwork
of Islamic tools engineered by traditional
Ulama. The so-called Islamic tools were reenergized by traditional Ulama from Fiqh
literature. These were Arabic names for different
transactions now baptized as corpus of holy
words which can never be disagreed. These
Arabic names were labeled, packaged and
marketed as if these were revealed as alternative
Islamic tools to the modern tools of commercial
banking. The social construction of non-Arab
Muslim societies is that they surrender to any
such names and labels that sounds in Arabic. All
such names would be respected, blindly
followed and never put to criticism. It happened
that interest is being sold to Muslims under the
beautiful packaging of these Arabic titles called
Islamic modes of financing.
The Muslim scholarship is engaged in a
fierce battle with the elimination of interest
from transactions. Less attention is paid to the
idea of engaging with the institution that propels
interest i.e., modern banking industry. In reality,
the problem is not with the interest/usury/riba
[11]

with the very institution of banking that is
dependent on interest for its survival. Imagining
bank without interest is to conceive a Muslim
without Ieeman (belief/faith). If Islamic
economics and the so-called Muslim economists
have to contribute something new and original
to the capitalist world then they should come up
with an original alternative ofthe modern
banking system. After reading and reading on
Islamic banking system and Islamic economics,
I can very safely say that the model of Islamic
banking is nothing but a blend of the modern
financial tools with a patchwork of Arabic
vocabulary presented as Islamic financial
modes.
Whenever there is a financial crisis or a
move towards Islamization of economy, the idea
of Islamic economics and Islamic banking
system is presented such as if it is a new
discovery or an amazing exploration. The fact of
the matter is that it has lost all its potential, its
originality and vitality very soon after it came
into existence.
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o a M u s l i m
economist(s) who come(s) up with an original
idea of visualizing a financial system that is
workable on this earth. This would be possible
only if we stop thinking about Islam as a
Complete System of life and start working as
normal human beings living on this planet
meeting its requirements. When we say Islam
offers a complete code of life from economy to
every part of life then we stop thinking
creatively and just wait for Islamic sources to
produce a system before us. Whereas in reality
Islam has nothing to do with producing
"systems" but only with basic parameters. If we
have assumed that Islam has its own banking
and financial system that will challenge and
replace the existing capitalist system then we
are mistaken. If we can just think differently
that Islam has discussed only some basic
parameters (those also very few with limited
scope and effect) then we can start thinking on
'what' and 'how' to work on an alternative
financial system. This is an idea the Muslim

economists will never bother to ponder over, I
am sure.
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SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & MUSLIM SOCIETIES
CALL FOR PAPERS: IBN KHALDUN TODAY
PRECURSOR OR ALTERNATIVE?

LANGUAGE OF THE SYMPOSIUM: Papers can be
presented in Turkish, Arabic, and English.
Simultaneous translation will be available. Selected
papers of the symposium will be published.

Ibn Khaldun Symposium May 29-31 2009 Istanbul
International Ibn Khaldun Society

TIMETABLE: November 30, 2008: Deadline for
submission of abstracts; December 30, 2008:
Confirmation of the accepted abstracts; March 30,
2009: Deadline for submission of papers; April 15,
2009: Deadline for confirmation of participation; May
29-31, 2009: Symposium

Co-sponsored by Duke Islamic Studies Center (DISC),
Duke University; Department of Malay Studies,
National University of Singapore; Istanbul Foundation
for Education and Research (ISAR)
The symposium is organized by the International Ibn
Khaldun Society and cosponsored by Duke University
and the National University of Singapore. This
international symposium is the second on Ibn
Khaldun. The first took place in Istanbul in 2006
where the participants decided to establish the
International Ibn Khaldun Society and to convene a
meeting every three years in Istanbul. Selected papers
from the first International Ibn Khaldun symposium
have been published in Turkish (Turkish Journal of
Islamic Studies, 2006) and English (Asian Journal of
Social Science, 2008). The papers from the second
International Symposium on Ibn Khaldun will also be
published in English and Turkish.

SCHEDULE: The symposium will begin on Friday,
May 29, 2009 and end on Sunday, May 31, 2009.
FUNDING: Accommodation will be provided for all
participants for three days. A limited amount of
funding, particularly for participants from abroad, is
available for travel expenses. Please contact the
Symposium Secretariat for further information.
ACTIVITIES: Visits to historical and cultural sites of
Istanbul such as the Topkapı Palace, the Saint Sophia,
and the Blue Mosque, and a Bosphorus tour will be
arranged for participants.
SECRETARIAT AND CONTACT INFORMATION

SUBMISSION INFORMATION: Papers can be
submitted through mail or e-mail. Submission of
papers should include:1) Cover page (containing: title,
participant’s name and institutional affiliation,
participant’s e-mail address, telephone and fax
numbers if available) 2) Abstract (300 words
maximum) 3) Biographical statement of participant
that describes research interests and recent
publications (200 words maximum)
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